Common errors

Go-around errors split sharply between decision errors (late decision, no decision, second-guessing) and execution errors (configuration sequence, trim, climb path). The decision errors are the more dangerous — a delayed go-around can land in the trees; an imperfect-but-decisive go-around lands in the pattern.

1. Late decision

What it looks like: the pilot continues a deteriorating approach past 500 ft AGL, past the round-out, into the flare — finally aborts at 20 ft AGL when the float is going to miss the runway.

Why: the misframing "I've already committed to landing." The pilot treats the approach as a one-way commitment and tries to salvage rather than abort.

Fix: the decision can come at any time, but the earlier the better. Below 500 ft AGL on an unstable approach is already late. The cognitive habit to cultivate: "Is the approach stable? If not — go." Asked every leg of the pattern, then every 100 ft on final.

2. No decision at all

What it looks like: the pilot rides a bad approach to a bad landing — hard touchdown, off-runway, runway excursion, or worse.

Why: the pilot didn't have the go-around as a live option in their attention budget. The approach was bad, but the decision to abort wasn't considered.

Fix: mentally rehearse the go-around on every approach. Brief it on downwind: "On any anomaly, I go around." That conversion from "if I have to" to "as the default" is the difference between a pilot who's ready and one who isn't.

3. Hesitation between recognition and power application

What it looks like: the pilot recognizes the trigger but pauses for 2–3 seconds before moving the throttle. The airplane loses altitude / closes distance to obstacle during the pause.

Why: the moment of decision is cognitive, even if the trigger is visceral. The pilot is thinking "is this really a go-around?" instead of acting.

Fix: throttle forward, then think. The go-around is reversible up to the moment it's initiated; once initiated, it's a clean climb. Power application is not the commitment to abandon the landing — it's the first step that enables the abandonment if the decision is final.

4. Premature full-flap retraction

What it looks like: the pilot retracts flaps all at once to clean configuration at low altitude. The airplane loses lift faster than thrust accelerates it; it sinks toward the runway.

Why: treating flap retraction as a single action ("get the flaps up") rather than a sequence.

Fix: partial first, then full. Flaps to takeoff setting → verify positive rate → flaps fully up at 500 ft AGL. The order isn't optional; it's safety.

5. Trim mismanagement → balloon

What it looks like: the airplane pitches up sharply when full power is added. The pilot fights it with forward elevator pressure but the airplane has already climbed steeply and lost airspeed.

Why: the airplane is trimmed nose-down for the approach. Full power exposes the trim. The pilot didn't anticipate the pitch couple.

Fix: forward elevator pressure at the moment the throttle moves. Then trim down progressively as the climb stabilizes at V_Y.

6. Drift off centerline

What it looks like: during the go-around climb, the airplane drifts off the runway centerline — usually into the wind if there's a crosswind.

Why: crosswind correction (crab) needs to be re-established for the climb. The side-slip that was set for the landing isn't appropriate for the climb-out.

Fix: transition from side-slip to crab as the airplane pitches up to climb attitude. Same crab management as the normal-takeoff climb (A).

7. Forgetting to communicate

What it looks like: the pilot executes a clean go-around but doesn't announce on the CTAF (or doesn't acknowledge to tower). Other pattern traffic is unaware.

Why: task saturation in the execution moment; communication is the first thing to drop.

Fix: brief the go-around call before the approach. Have the radio call ready. After the go-around is established (positive climb, configuration cleaning up), make the call.

How errors compound. Decision errors (#1, #2, #3) are the entry point — a pilot who hesitates is more likely to go through trim mismanagement (#5) because they're rushing the execution to catch up. Configuration errors (#4) cascade into climb errors (#5, #6) because the airplane is in a worse state than it should be. The doctrine that prevents most errors: rehearse the go-around on every approach. Make the decision available without thought. The maneuver is then just an execution problem, which the procedure handles cleanly.