Principles & why

The go-around is the decision tool that protects every other approach and landing in Area IV from going wrong. Normal landing (B), soft-field landing (D), and short-field landing (F) all forward-link to this maneuver — and they do so because a bad approach can almost always be saved by aborting and trying again, while a salvaged bad approach lands accidents in NTSB reports. The maneuver itself takes 30 seconds; the doctrine that surrounds it is what makes pilots safer.

The stabilized approach (formal definition)

A stabilized approach is one where, by 500 ft AGL, every relevant parameter is set and steady:

Parameter	Stabilized by 500 ft AGL
Speed	V_REF ±5 KIAS
Path	On glidepath (or normal descent angle for VFR pattern)
Configuration	Final landing configuration (full flaps, gear down)
Power	Set for the descent path (typically 1,300–1,700 RPM in a trainer)
Alignment	On runway centerline
Trim	Set for hands-off approach

If any one of these is not stabilized at 500 ft AGL, the approach is unstable. The standard isn't "fix it by the round-out" — the standard is go around now.

Pre-selected: airspeed unstable. The verdict banner shows the doctrinal stance — even one parameter at 500 ft AGL triggers the go-around. Tap to add more unstable rows and watch the verdict re-tone from caution to rose. This is the asymmetry the next section's prose names.

The 500-ft threshold comes from industry incident data: unstabilized approaches below this altitude correlate strongly with runway excursions, hard landings, and runway overruns. The numerical threshold isn't in the FAA ACS as a published bust criterion, but it's used by every major commercial operator and is the doctrinal standard for instruction.

Decision triggers (comprehensive)

Beyond the stabilized-approach criteria, any of the following triggers a go-around:

Approach-state triggers:

• Speed outside ±5 KIAS of V_REF on short final.
• Vertical sink rate > ~700 fpm in a trainer on short final.
• High or low on glidepath at the round-out.
• Loss of visual reference on the runway.

Aircraft-state triggers:

• Engine indication abnormal (RPM, oil pressure, fuel flow).
• Control surface or trim feels unusual.
• Configuration not set (flaps, gear).

Runway / environment triggers:

• Anything on the runway (aircraft, vehicle, animal, debris).
• Wake turbulence warning or hazard from preceding aircraft.
• Sudden crosswind shift exceeding aircraft demonstrated crosswind.
• Wind shear / gust front.
• ATC instruction to go around.

Pilot-state triggers:

• Loss of situational awareness.
• Task saturation (cockpit demands exceeding attention budget).
• Disorientation or vertigo.

A go-around triggered by any one of these is a successful decision, not a failed approach. The go-around is the right answer to every trigger above.

"When in doubt, go around" as doctrine

The doctrine is not "go around if you're sure something is wrong." It's "go around if you're not sure everything is right."

The asymmetry matters. A go-around that wasn't strictly necessary costs three minutes of fuel and a circuit of the pattern. A salvaged landing that should have been a go-around can cost the airplane. The expected costs are wildly different, so the decision threshold should be biased heavily toward going around.

This is also why the go-around is not graded as a failure by examiners — it's graded as a demonstrated competency. A DPE who watches a pilot recognize an unstabilized approach and execute a clean go-around sees correct judgment; the maneuver itself meets the V.H standards if flown properly.

Execution under stress

The maneuver is muscle memory because the decision is cognitive. By the time the throttle moves forward, the pilot's attention budget is already taxed by the conditions that triggered the go-around. The execution sequence — power → pitch → configuration → climb → pattern — has to be automatic so the pilot can manage the situation rather than think through the procedure.

This is why instructors drill go-arounds: not because the maneuver is hard, but because the decision needs to be available without thought. A pilot who's done 20 go-arounds in training will spot the trigger and act; a pilot who's done 2 will hesitate.

Trim management — the pitch couple

A heavily trimmed approach airplane wants to balloon nose-up when full power is added. The trim is set for the approach pitch attitude at approach airspeed and reduced power; the engine adds nose-up pitching moment (downward thrust line is below the CG on most singles, plus the increased airflow over the elevator pitches up).

The combined effect: throttle forward → strong nose-up pitch → if uncorrected, the airplane climbs too steeply, possibly toward stall.

The fix: forward elevator pressure at the moment the throttle moves, then trim down progressively as the climb is established. The pilot is fighting the trim until they can re-trim for V_Y.

This is the most common technical-execution challenge in the go-around — and the reason instructors teach pilots to "think trim" as the throttle moves, not after.

Don't second-guess once committed

Once the throttle is forward, the decision is made. From that point:

• Don't lower the nose back to the runway.
• Don't reduce power "to see if it stabilizes."
• Don't abandon the climb to try to land.

A pilot who flip-flops between go-around and landing puts the airplane in a worse state than either choice alone. The airplane is mid-transition between the approach configuration and the climb configuration, with the pilot's attention split. Commit and follow through.

Why this maneuver matters

Every approach and landing in Area IV depends on this maneuver existing. The normal landing (B), soft-field landing (D), short-field landing (F), and even the forward slip (G) all forward-link to "when in doubt, go around" as the safety valve. The go-around isn't a fallback — it's the default decision when the approach isn't going as planned. The other maneuvers are the path of least resistance when the approach is going as planned. The pilot's job is to recognize the difference.